Over the past few years,
particularly since the publication of The Constitution of Society, people
in a diversity of fields have made use of concepts drawn from structuration
theory in pursuing empirical inquiries. Areas in question include the
study of stratification, organizations, educational systems, processes of urbanism,
state forms, traditional communities, gender and ethnic divisions, mass
media, legal systems, and others besides. I have been pleased, although also
rather surprised, by the number and proliferation of such endeavours. On the
other hand, on the whole I do not feel overly sympathetic towards the ways in
which most authors have employed my concepts in their work. Most often, this is
because they have tried to import the concepts I developed en bloc into
their research, seemingly imagining that this will somehow lead to major
methodological innovations. I have never believed this to be a sound approach,
which is one of the main reasons why in The Constitution of Society, I
emphasized that the theory should be utilized only in a selective way in
empirical work and should be seen more as a sensitizing device than as
providing detailed guidelines for research procedure.
While many have attempted to employ
my perspective in a direct way in empirical study, others have taken a more
negative stance. In other words, they have argued that structuration theory
provides few or no useful pointers to the conduct of empirical work. An example
is a lengthy review by Thrift.11 Writing about the chapter in The
Constitution of Society in which I relate structuration theory to problems
of empirical investigation, Thrift says that he finds this discussion 'deeply
disappointing5. He sees my attitude as altogether too qualified, arguing that
the theory 'should have a considerable amount to say . . . about the conduct
and methods of research'. The disappointment comes from my not having delivered
goods which it seemed to Thrift that the enterprise I have undertaken could reasonably
be expected to convey.
Gregson's contribution to this
volume contains some parallels to Thrift's view, although the conclusions she
draws are different. Concentrating her attention on the same chapter in The
Constitution of Society referred to by Thrift, she finds the connections I
draw between structuration theory and the empirical research unconvincing. They
lack, she says, 'the degree of specification required for empirical work' (p.
240). It is all very well to be told that all social research involves an
ethnographic moment, that lay members of society are skilful and knowledgeable,
or that one must have a sensitivity to how action is co-ordinated across time
and space; but these are too far removed from the groundwork of empirical
research to be of any value in guiding it. The various examples of research
work which I refer to in the chapter in question were all carried out without
any need for the concepts which, as it were, I have foisted upon them. Picking
up my emphasis upon ontology rather than epistemology, Gregson concludes that
the concepts connected with structuration make up a 'second-order theory',
concerned 'with conceptualizing the general constituents of human society' and
distinct from 'first-order theory', which generates concepts that apply
directly to specific empirical settings.
I agree with some aspects of what
Gregson has to say, but not with others. In my view, we should recognize what
might be called the relative autonomy of theory and research.
Theoretical thinking needs in substantial part to proceed in its own terms and
cannot be expected to be linked at every point to empirical considerations. The
more encompassing or generalized a set of theoretical notions is, the more this
is the case. Empirical work, on the other hand, cannot proceed in the absence
of abstract concepts or theoretical notions, but these are necessarily drawn
upon selectively and cannot be ever-present. The category 'empirical work' is
very large, moreover, and covers numerous different sorts of inquiries. Some
types of research have local, descriptive objectives, while others attempt more
to explore explanatory hypotheses. Research responds to contextualized
inquiries, and one of the main errors of those who formulated canons of
research under the aegis of logical empiricism was to regard the only
'authentic' work as that which sets up specific hypotheses, derived from
theory, and proceeds to seek to test them. The 'how?' and 'why?' questions
which social research answers are too variegated to be subsumed within so neat
a scheme.
Similarly, 'theory' covers a
multiplicity of endeavours. The main tenets of structuration theory, as Gregson
rightly points out, are intended to apply over the whole range of human social
activity, in any and every context of action. Other concepts I have coined or
worked with, such as 'the commodification of space' or 'surveillance
mechanisms', have somewhat more substance, in the sense in which they direct
attention to specific processes or aspects of concrete social systems. However,
I would not myself draw a distinction between 'first-order' and 'second-order'
concepts. Theory is also contextual. Some concepts and theoretical schemes are
more abstract than others, and those involved in the general suppositions of
structuration theory do indeed operate at a high level of abstraction. But even
the most abstract concepts interlace, or can be connected with, more specific
ones. This is as true of the notions of structuration theory as of any other
generalized standpoint in the social sciences.
One might if one likes make a
rough distinction between 'theory', as a generic category, and 'theories',
where the latter term refers to explanatory generalizations. Structuration
theory clearly belongs to the first of these types rather than the second. As I
have pointed out in The Constitution of Society, the significance
of'theories', as compared to 'theory', can easily be exaggerated. Some writers
are prone to pour scorn upon the tendencies of the social sciences to produce
abstract conceptual schemes at the expense of explanatory
generalizations-theory, rather than theories - but I do not think such
complaints for the most part are justified. No doubt many arid conceptual webs
are spun, but so also are many vapid or uninteresting generalizations proposed.
'Theory', in my view, is at least as important in the social science as
theories; I would not accord one logical priority over the other.
I do not agree with Gregson's
contention that structuration theory is largely irrelevant to empirical
research. Being abstract and generalized, and being 'theory' as contrasted to a
set of 'theories', it is necessarily at some distance from particular research
projects. I would still maintain today the position I set out in the chapter
previously referred to in The Constitution of Society, which I would see
as more relevant to the conduct of empirical research than Gregson allows.
Structuration theory is not intended as a method of research, or even as a
methodological approach. The concepts I have developed do not allow one to say:
'henceforth, the only viable type of research in the social sciences is
qualitative field study'. I have an eclectic approach to method, which again
rests upon the premise that research enquiries are contextually oriented. For
some purposes, detailed ethnographic work is appropriate, while for others
archival research, or the sophisticated statistical analysis of secondary
materials, might be more suitable. But I do think the framework of
structuration theory both provides concepts relevant to empirical research and
also warns against the pitfalls of some types of research procedure or
interpretations of research results.
The objective of my discussion in
The Constitution of Society was to demonstrate these points, and I need
only briefly recapitulate them here. In some part my remarks concerned the
logic of research; to some degree they were directed towards illustrating how
the concepts of structuration theory 'look' when examined in relation to
concrete research tasks. For instance, it is a logical feature of social
research, following from the double hermeneutic, that all research endeavours
have an ethnographic or 'anthropological' aspect to them. Since this is a
logical point, by definition it does not disclose anything directly which is an
option for a researcher; it sets out what all social investigation, without
exception, involves. Yet it would be wrong to say that it is without direct
relevance to the conduct and interpretation of research. Thus someone who
believes she or he is dealing only with 'hard facts' - say in the shape of a
mathematical analysis of quantitative variables - might both misconstrue what
those 'facts' are and other conclusions to be drawn from them, if the point is
ignored. Cicourel demonstrated this effectively enough some while ago in his
discussion of the use of official statistics in social research.
In my discussion I looked at
several pieces of research, of a heterogeneous character. The point, as I
believe I made clear, was not to demonstrate what research 'inspired by
structuration theory' would be like; it was, as I put it at the time, to work
out 'the logical implications of studying a "subject-matter" of which
the researcher is already a part' and to elucidate 'the substantive connotations
of the core notions of action and structure'. Looking at an investigation of a
directly ethnographic kind - Willis's study - 1 sought to show that some of the
main virtues of the research derive from the fact that the researcher was
sensitive to some of the key emphases formally elaborated in structuration
theory. I also wanted to show (something Willis was also very conscious of)
that small-scale, detailed ethnographic work can show us a great deal about
institutional reproduction. In relating the empirical observations to such
reproduction, moreover, no functionalist assertions of any kind are required.
The other examples I used were designed to show how structural constraint,
contradiction and institutional change could be examined in research contexts involving
quite different empirical procedures from that adopted by Willis. I sought to
demonstrate that the analysis of structural constraint presumes an empirically
grounded interpretation of motivation; that, per contra, the empirical
study of contradiction cannot just proceed on the level of motivated action,
but presumes the study of structural constraint; and that the effective
empirical analysis of institutional change means grasping the relations between
reflexively monitored transformations and unintended consequences of action.
Structuration theory is a broad
perspective upon the study of action, structure and institutions. Its relation
to empirical research is much the same as that of competing perspectives or
schools of thought. Robert K. Merton's codification of functionalism, as set
out in his book Social Theory and Social Structure, for example,
offers an overall orientation to social analysis, but scarcely provides recipes
for empirical research. As Bernstein shows, many of the presuppositions of
structuration theory stand in direct contrast to the framework which Merton
established, and which served as an overall orientation for a whole generation
of sociologists. I should be happy indeed were my writings to have anything
approaching the influence exerted by those of
Merton. The main point in this context, however, is that the status of
the two endeavours is approximately the same. Merton tried to establish close
ties between the more abstract principles he endeavoured to set up and other theoretical
and empirical work upon which he became engaged. The same also applies in my
case, as I indicated in the opening paragraphs of this reply. There may be no
'structurationist programme' of research, but I can certainly sketch what I
would take to be some principal empirical concerns upon which social research
should be focused.
Let me first of all, however,
connect some of the general emphases of structuration theory with empirical
work by 'reversing the coin' from the style of presentation I adopted in the
chapter in question in The Constitution of Society. In that chapter, as
mentioned, I analysed certain aspects of concrete research projects in order to
provide an empirical illumination of some of the basic elements of
structuration theory. It might be helpful here if I briefly proceed in the
opposite fashion, indicating how social research might proceed when consciously
informed by the structurationist outlook.
Let us suppose we wished to study
marriage relationships, and the break-up of marriage, in a number of
communities of varying socio-economic levels. Our main interest is in the
nature of marital relationships and in the origins and consequences of marital
separation. Information is obtained from various sources: fieldwork study in
two or three of the communities in question, in-depth interviews and the use of
local archival materials. How might some of the notions of structuration theory
be used as sensitizing devices in the pursuit of such a research inquiry?
The prime underlying orientation,
both of the planning of the investigation and the interpretation of its
results, would be towards examining the complexities of action/structure relations.
This is a mixed process of observation and decoding. As an
operational principle of research, what structuration theory suggests is not
that we should seek to categorize or classify the rules and resources involved
in a given area of social conduct, but rather that we should place the emphasis
squarely upon the constitution and reconstitution of social practices.
Investigating 'structure' in the structurationist sense is more than simply
looking for patterns in how the behaviour of some individuals connects with
that of others. It means delving into the subtle interplay between the intractability
of social institutions and the options they offer for agents who have
knowledge, but bounded discursive awareness, of how those institutions work.
We would ground the research,
therefore, in an attempt to examine stasis and change in the reproduction of
institutionalized practices. The 'marriage relationship' is a set of
expectations held by partners about each other, sanctioned within the
overarching framework of the legal system. These expectations 'enter into' the
relationship, but they are only constituted in and through the regular habits,
strategies of behaviour and so forth which partners follow, inside and outside
the relationship itself. Consider, for instance, the question of how far the
marital relationship itself is strongly emphasized in social interaction, or
alternatively is fairly well submerged in other kin ties and obligations. This
is best studied through showing how regularized day-to-day, or more periodic,
activities serve consistently to remake - or perhaps help unmake - wider kin
ties. Thus one instance of this, in matrilocal marriage, might be the practice
which women have of popping in to see their mothers on a regular and routine
basis. Where such a practice exists, it expresses informal conventions which are
reconstituted in its very enactment. The practice may be relatively
'untheorized' by those concerned, since it is simply accepted as what is 'done'
in the area. Alternatively, a greater range of skilful, strategic thinking may
be involved where the practice for one reason or another has come under
pressure. Thus if husbands now expect wives to spend more time in the home,
caring for and improving it - or if they expect wives to take on paid
employment - various more calculative and 'thought-through' modes of sustaining
daughter-mother intimacy might have to be devised.
'Structure' here is embedded in
practice (or, in actuality, in a diverse, fragmentary and sometimes
contradictory series of practices) in which it is recursively implicated. Study
of the 'everyday' or the 'day-to-day' forms a basic part of the analysis here,
many seemingly trivial or mundane features of what people do being the actual
'groundwork' of larger-scale institutions. It is in the durability of
institutions that we look to discern the structural properties of systems of
relationships in which people's activities are engaged. In empirical terms,
this immediately means an 'opening out' across time and space. In other words,
it necessitates a historical or developmental perspective and a sensitivity to
variations of location. In the case of the hypothetical research project, this
would involve far more than just a gross comparison of communities in terms of
variations according to geographical situation or class composition. It would mean
- ideally at least - a thoroughgoing study of the contextualities of
institutionalized patterns of interaction. For instance, the pattern of
daughters popping in to see mothers might be temporally sedimented as tradition
and spatially organized via locales in which a considerable degree of gender
segregation is maintained - through a combination of matrilocality and a male
'pub and club' pattern.
Localized forms of practice can
be 'mapped' institutionally within wider social systems in terms of what I have
sometimes called 'structural sets' (or simply 'structures' in the plural).
Studying structural sets is best understood as examining the articulation of
institutions across time and space. Structural sets are formed through the
mutual convertibility of rules and resources in one domain of action into those
pertaining to another. In the case of the putative research project, a number
of such articulations could be diagnosed and analysed. For instance, marriage
relationships, gender and labour markets are connected through certain general
conditions of mutual convertibility which 'lead into' the situated practices in
which agents are involved. As discussed previously, gender cannot be seen as
simply a number of characteristics possessed by individuals, but rather has to
be understood as structured via rules and resources specifying connotations of
sexual difference. Gender divisions represent differential 'convertible
currency' in labour markets, since the institutionalized practices which
prevail in the economic domain mostly favour men rather than women. Labour
market characteristics articulate with the domain of family life, which in turn
helps restructure gender. Insofar as these connections span the wider societal
system, they provide for similarities of behaviour and experience which in some
part transcend regional and class differences. Structural sets are implicated
in what in The Constitution of Society I called circuits of
reproduction: feedback systems by means of which structural sets and structural
principles are grounded and regrounded in institutionalized practices
'stretching' across time-space regions. Studying concretely just how the
interconnections between marriage relationships: gender: labour markets:
marriage relationships are 'played out' means seeking to identify how these
'conversions' between institutional areas are reproduced in actual
conduct.
Conditions of change are built
into reproduction circuits, especially in the context of modern societies, in
which they are in some part reflexively organized. Suppose we wish to
investigate why there are increasing levels of separation and divorce in the
communities in the research study. How might we analyse this? Many factors can
of course influence processes of social change. But in empirical work, as in
theoretical reflection, it is crucial to try to identify how unintended
consequences interlace with the forms of knowledge which, both on practical and
discursive levels, actors bring to bear upon the contexts of their behaviour.
In the research with which we are concerned, this task could be approached on
various levels. Like so many other areas in modern societies, the institutional
milieux of marriage and divorce have become highly mobilized reflexively - via, for example, the regular revision of divorce
laws and other legal provisions, which are understood by everyone to have to
'correspond' in a general way to alterations in conditions of social life.
These alterations are monitored sociologically, this knowledge filtering down
to the day-to-day modes of behaviour which people follow in marriage and other
aspects of their personal lives. What results are shifting forms of awareness
involved in the practices that actually express marriage relationships, and in
the objectives which individuals seek to realize in or through those
relationships. Difficult as such a task may be, it would be incumbent upon the
research to capture these interconnections empirically.
Let me
generalize from these observations. What would a structurationist programme of
research for modern social science look like? First, it would concentrate upon
the orderings of institutions across time and space, rather than taking as its
object the study of'human societies'. The term 'society' may well be so
engrained in sociological discourse as to be ineradicable, and I do not feel it
necessary to avoid using it. However, where we speak of'a' society, we have to
be fully aware that this is not a 'pure social form', but a politically and
territorially constituted system. It is one mode of 'bracketing' time and space
among others, that bracketing process itself being the primary object of study
in social science.
Second,
a structurationist programme would analyse social systems in terms of shifting
modes of institutional articulation. Every social system, no matter how small
or ephemeral, or large scale and more permanent, gains its systemic qualities
only through regularities of social reproduction. The ways in which such
regularities - which consist of social practices - are organized in and through
the behaviour of contextually located actors have to be subjected to empirical
investigation. Modes of institutional articulation - across time and space -
are the 'building-blocks' of time-space distanciation. Third, such a programme
would be continuously sensitive to the reflexive intrusions of knowledge into
the conditions of social reproduction. This has nothing intrinsically to do
with contrasts between the small scale and large scale, or between 'micro' and
'macro' analysis. We can see this from the fact that world-wide connections are
today reflexively monitored - as, for example, in the case of investment
decisions taken by the leaders of the giant corporations.
Fourth,
a structurationist programme would be oriented to the impact of its own
research upon the social practices and forms of social organization it
analyses. This is an aspect of reflexivity which involved us in the various
levels of critique noted earlier. The problems it raises are formidably
complex, but are quite central to the 'self-understanding' of the social
sciences in the current era.
To my
mind, however, the empirical implications of structuration theory have to be
pursued primarily through the introduction of considerations - concerned with
particular types of social system and their transformation - which are not
part of the theory itself. These are bound up with the themes I set out at the
beginning, and this is an appropriate point at which to close the circle in
ending my commentary upon the contributions to this book. The chief focus of
contemporary social science - although it is a very broad one - has to be upon
analysing the shattering impact of modernity, against the backdrop of the
limited usefulness of the traditions of thought which we have inherited in the
social sciences. Such study demands serious theoretical reappraisals, combined
with the pursuance of a diversity of empirical inquiries. Do we now live in a
world which has lurched away from earlier trends of social and cultural
development expressed in modernity? Or do we now live in a period shaped by the
radicalizing of modernity: the first time at which modernity has become
globalized (which is my view)? How should we best examine the increasing
intrusion of distant events into the intimacies of personal life? What are the
social textures emerging from altered modes of the co-ordination of time and
space, as this affects overlapping types of social system? How should we
conceive of, and further elaborate, the critique of ideology and moral critique
in the face of the massive transformations of our time? Momentous questions,
certainly, but I cannot see how anyone working in the social sciences today –
whether engaged in carrying out empirical research 'on the ground', or pursuing
more theoretical reflection - can avoid them.
SOURCE : Social
theory of modern societies: Anthony Giddens and his critics (1994) / edited by
David Held and John Thompson. © Cambridge University Press 1989
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